What Bergson Means by ‘Image’ in Matter and Memory: Clarified

If you have ever wondered, What does Bergson mean by image in Matter and Memory, you are not alone. The term ‘image’ is the hinge on which Henri Bergson’s entire argument turns, yet it rarely means what first-time readers expect.

In everyday language, an image is a picture in the mind. For Bergson, an image is not a private mental photo. It names a way things exist and interact before we split the world into inner representations and outer objects. This shift powers his bold answer to the mind–body problem.

To see why this matters, it helps to place his idea historically. Bergson’s wager reimagines perception, memory, and action as movements within a field of images rather than transactions between a mind and a world. If that sounds radical, it is—and it remains surprisingly current for debates in cognitive science and philosophy of mind.

For context on the thinker and text, see Henri Bergson and Matter and Memory on Wikipedia, as well as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

• Image names what exists in the world before we divide it into external things and internal representations—call it appearance-as-actionable.
• Perception is a selection within this field of images, filtered by our body’s capacities and needs for action.
• The brain does not manufacture reality; it modulates images by inhibiting and prioritizing pathways for practical engagement.

These three claims let Bergson bypass the stale fight between naive realism and subjective idealism. They also recast memory and attention as functions that tune our access to a world already brimming with significance.

We usually approach perception with a forked map: either things imprint themselves on us (realism) or the mind projects its representations (idealism). Bergson’s ‘image’ collapses this fork by naming the relational being of things as they can affect and be affected.

An image is not a copy in the head, nor a mute block outside. It is a mode of existence registered by possible interactions. The color of the coffee mug is not merely in the brain or in the object; it is the way the mug stands toward a perceiver capable of acting with it—grasping, sipping, avoiding spills.

In this sense, images are public and shareable. They belong to the world, but they are articulated through bodies. The upshot is a metaphysics of contact and capacity, not mirrors. For a helpful orientation to this redefinition in the original context, see Matter and Memory.

By making the image basic, Bergson avoids the classic deadlock. Naive realism says the world is just there, fully formed, waiting to be copied. Subjective idealism says the mind constructs the world from within. Both assume a gulf to be bridged—a problem Bergson sidesteps.

In an image ontology, matter is a set of images and the body is one image among others, distinguished by its power to act. Perception becomes a selection from this field, tuned to useful differences. There is no need to smuggle in a representational theater or posit mysterious interactions between two unrelated substances.

Philosophically, this reframes the mind–body problem. Causation is not mental pushing the physical or vice versa; it is modulation within a network of images. For background on the traditional problem Bergson is challenging, see the mind–body problem overview.

Perception, for Bergson, is not the passive registration of stimuli. It is the movement of a body through a web of images that it prunes for the sake of action. Your hand reaching for a cup already tacitly organizes space by graspability, weight, and temperature risk.

This is why Bergson talks of a center of indetermination—your body delays automatic reactions long enough to choose. The field of images is dense with possibilities; perception is the economy of relevance that makes some stand out.

Contemporary readers may hear resonances with enactive or affordance-based views of perception. While historically distinct, the shared emphasis is on sensorimotor capacities rather than inner pictures. For a quick primer on the general topic, see perception on Wikipedia.

• Field: a surround of actionable differences.
• Body: a selecting center, not a detached spectator.
• Perception: a dynamic filtering for possible deeds.

Bergson famously claims the brain is an organ of selection. It does not fabricate the world but inhibits most of it, letting through what matters for ongoing projects. Attention is the conscious tip of this iceberg, spotlighting just enough detail to guide the next move.

This anticipates known roles for neural inhibition and action selection. By cutting noise and gating pathways, inhibition sculpts perception into a tool for survival and skill. Bergson’s point is philosophical: perception’s function is practical discrimination, not full reproduction.

Attention, therefore, is not a mental zoom on inner images. It is a reconfiguration of the image-field by suppressing distractions and amplifying affordances. Memory plugs into this by supplying past-relevant patterns that change what the present image invites you to do next.

• Action: the ultimate criterion for what is perceived.
• Attention: selective activation of useful details.
• Brain: infrastructure for inhibition, not a picture factory.

Examples make Bergson’s notion of image click. Watch how perception is already organized by the next possible act.

• Catching a ball: You do not perceive every dimple on the surface. You track a trajectory and time your grip. The image is streamlined by action-relevant variables.
• Driving at dusk: Headlights and brake lights pop, background recedes. Your visual field becomes an action map for safe stopping, not a high-res panorama.
• Kitchen kettle: You see handle, steam, hot zones—features carved out by grasping and safety. The kettle’s image is the kettle-as-usable-now.
• Smartphone buzz: In a meeting, the notification becomes salient or suppressed depending on goals. Attention retunes the image-field without changing the device itself.
• Trail running: Roots and rocks leap out as hazards at speed; the forest’s image becomes a rhythm of footholds and risks.

In each case, the world is not redrawn in your head. Instead, the same surroundings become different images as your capacities and intentions shift.

Once ‘image’ is understood, Matter and Memory reorganizes itself. Memory no longer sits in a box behind the eyes; it is a power to supplement the present image with the past for better action. Matter is not dead stuff; it is the public weave of images within which bodies carve viable paths.

Perception is right-sized: less than the full world, more than a private movie. The brain’s role regains clarity: a finely tuned inhibitory filter enabling flexible behavior. And the mind–body dispute softens, since both mind and matter are redeployed inside a shared image ontology.

If you started by asking, What does Bergson mean by image in Matter and Memory, the answer is a radical middle: the actionable presence of the world, jointly shaped by what things can do and what you can do with them.

• Q: Is an image just a mental picture?
  A: No. For Bergson, an image is the public, actionable presence of things—how they can affect and be affected—before we split inner from outer.
• Q: How does image relate to matter?
  A: Matter is the set of images. Your body is one image among others, marked by its power to delay responses and choose.
• Q: Where is perception located—inside or outside?
  A: Neither. Perception is a selection in the field of images, organized by your body’s capacities, attention, and goals.
• Q: What role does the brain play?
  A: The brain inhibits and prioritizes signals to support action; it is not a projector creating reality. See neural inhibition for scientific context.
• Q: Does this view deny objective reality?
  A: No. It reframes objectivity as the shareable field of images open to multiple bodies and perspectives, rather than as a picture stored in no one’s head.
• Q: How does memory fit?
  A: Memory enriches the present image with relevant past patterns, altering what counts as actionable now—without collapsing memory into brain storage alone.
• Q: Where can I read more?
  A: Start with Matter and Memory, the Stanford Encyclopedia entry, and Britannica on Bergson.